Moral Argument From Evil

To the philosophical Christian it's as obvious as a bright red smacked arse wobbling two feet from your face that the Problem of Evil is a non-starter. However, some atheists won't let it go. They try to rework it so that it makes sense and can avoid the hurdles that it falls at (if you think it even gets out the gate).

Here's one complicated attempt that I found recently. It's set up a little differently that I'm used to, but it's not a big deal. It's 'The Moral Argument from Evil' from Dean Stretton:

1. A1. The most rational theists know (i.e., have a justified, true belief) that God exists.
2. A2a. For any possible world W, if God exists in W, then every instance of evil in W is objectively justified.
3. A2b. If God exists, then there is objective justification for any actual instance of evil, including those evils for which there is a human onlooker
4. A2. If God exists, then there is objective justification for every actual instance of evil, justification that will occur even if no onlooker intervenes to stop or prevent that evil.
5. A3. Some members of the class of most rational theists (as I have defined that class) are theists who know A2.
6. A4. Some of the most rational theists (namely, those who know A2) know that there is objective justification for any actual instance of evil, justification that will occur even if no onlooker intervenes to stop or prevent that evil.
7. A5. If human person P knows that there is objective justification for evil E, and that this justification will occur even if P does not intervene to stop or prevent E, then P is morally justified in allowing E to occur.
8. A6. Some of the most rational theists (namely, those who know A2) are morally justified in allowing any actual evil to occur.
9. A7. If the most rational theists know that God exists, then some of those theists (namely, those who know A2) are morally justified in allowing any evil to occur.
10. A8. Even the most rational theists (including those who know A2) are not morally justified in allowing just any evil to occur.
11. A9. Even the most rational theists do not know that God exists.
12. A10. If the most rational theists do not know that God exists, then no theist knows that God exists.
13. A11. No theist knows that God exists.
14. A12. For any given theist, that theist’s belief that God exists is either false or unjustified.
15. A13. If God exists, then some theists are justified in believing that God exists.
16. A14. If God exists, then no theist has a false belief that God exists.
17. A15. If God exists, then some theists know (i.e., have a justified, true belief) that God exists.
18. A16. It is not the case that some theists know (i.e., have a justified and true belief) that God exists.
19. A17. God does not exist.

Look how long winded it is. These are the lengths that have to be gone to to try and salvage the wreckage of The Problem of Evil. Oh boy.
Let's check it out.

1. A1. The most rational theists know (i.e., have a justified, true belief) that God exists.

Yeah. This is fine. Based on various powerful evidences, we have a justified belief in God. Most of us go further to say we know with certainty based on our own personal relationships.

1. A2a. For any possible world W, if God exists in W, then every instance of evil in W is objectively justified.

This is recognising that the Problem of Evil doesn't work because there's always a good reason for evil to exist. Free will, human testing, various other greater goods.

1. A2b. If God exists, then there is objective justification for any actual instance of evil, including those evils for which there is a human onlooker

Basically the same as A2a, maybe that's why they're connected. For some reason this adds a witness. Perhaps he thinks that if a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to see or hear it, then it didn't happen. I don't know what difference a witness makes. This is just to set up later premises. A-premises? Atheist premises? What's with the As? Not important. Move on.

1. A2. If God exists, then there is objective justification for every actual instance of evil, justification that will occur even if no onlooker intervenes to stop or prevent that evil.

Yep, so A2a, A2b, and A2 are all pretty much identical. Just backing each other up for clarity I guess. Clarity is always good, so breaking it down a little doesn't hurt.

1. A3. Some members of the class of most rational theists (as I have defined that class) are theists who know A2.

Right. Evil is justified by all sorts of stuff. Got it. That's why the Problem of Evil doesn't work.

1. A4. Some of the most rational theists (namely, those who know A2) know that there is objective justification for any actual instance of evil, justification that will occur even if no onlooker intervenes to stop or prevent that evil.

Yep.

1. A5. If human person P knows that there is objective justification for evil E, and that this justification will occur even if P does not intervene to stop or prevent E, then P is morally justified in allowing E to occur.

No. This looks like where the thing is going to break apart. This sounds more like the sort of thing some less theologically literate believers say that's like "It was God's will that the tornado killed all those people" and then feel fine about it. Rational Christians understand that as well as objective morality existing, we also have objective moral duties. If we know we can prevent something objectively evil, it is our job to do something about it. It's not up to us to allow evil. God allows it for his various reasons, one of which is that we have to prove that we want to get rid of it, just like he will in the end after it has brought about its greatest good.
So this argument goes on for another twelve A-Ps. It's dead right here. I'll carry on anyway to see how it goes.

1. A6. Some of the most rational theists (namely, those who know A2) are morally justified in allowing any actual evil to occur.

This is a weird one. Taken as a statement on its own it sounds like an assertion that needs support. It doesn't stand on its own. It needs the support from the previous premises to know what its referring to. A6 is kind of repeating A5, so we know it's wrong. If God exists, then people are not justified in allowing evil. However, if atheism is true, there is no evil and so any action is justified (justified might be the wrong word. 'Permissable' is more accurate).

1. A7. If the most rational theists know that God exists, then some of those theists (namely, those who know A2) are morally justified in allowing any evil to occur.

Some theists are morally justified in allowing evil? Why some? Why not everyone? Just because the rational ones' are the ones that know, doesn't mean they are the only ones who are justified. Surely everyone is by these rules? This premise is a bit of a mess. Not surprising as the whole thing started falling apart a couple of premises ago.

1. A8. Even the most rational theists (including those who know A2) are not morally justified in allowing just any evil to occur.

This just took a surprising left turn. I agree with this premise as I explained. Our objective moral duties (that we share with God) explain why we have no justification.

1. A9. Even the most rational theists do not know that God exists.

I'm not rational now. I know God exists just like I know my mother exists. I've got a two way relationship. You could take it a step back and say I could be in the Matrix and my reality is all imaginary, so I can't really know anything for certain, but that's why we generally take 'know' to mean 'justified belief' as this argument set up earlier.
Either way, I also have a justified belief, based on heaps of evidence. I know it with the same certainty that we know Abraham Lincoln existed. Perhaps the existence of Lincoln was a foolproof conspiracy, but that amount of doubt doesn't seem worth bothering with.
This premise asks way too much from the evidence. Scientific theories rarely have 100% certainty, and that's what this premise wants.

1. A10. If the most rational theists do not know that God exists, then no theist knows that God exists.

Why can't a crazy person know something that a rational person can't? This premise doesn't follow. 

1. A11. No theist knows that God exists.

So this is meant to follow from A9 and A10, but neither of those premises are sound. So this premise is also not sound.

1. A12. For any given theist, that theist’s belief that God exists is either false or unjustified.

Again, this doesn't work at all. It's asking for knowledge to mean 'certainty' instead of 'justified belief'. So there's been an equivocation on 'knowing'. This premise also seems to assume that there is no evidence to justify belief in God, and there's no rational Christians who have certainty. 

1. A13. If God exists, then some theists are justified in believing that God exists.

OK. Maybe the next premises are going to claw back some sense from the mess of the last few. Yes. If God is real, then wait... some theists? No. If God exists, then all theists are justified in believing! As long as we're only talking about existence and no other specific things, then his existence justifies all theists!

1. A14. If God exists, then no theist has a false belief that God exists.

Right. So why did you just say 'some'? Now you're contradicting yourself. Shall we pretend A13 didn't happen and stick with this one?

1. A15. If God exists, then some theists know (i.e., have a justified, true belief) that God exists.

We're back to the non-certainty definition of knowledge. Stick to one please. This reworking of the argument needs another reworking... Anyway, this premise is fine.

1. A16. It is not the case that some theists know (i.e., have a justified and true belief) that God exists.

OK. So we're changing 'know' to mean both 'justified' and 'true. That might explain the messiness from before. I'd agree that day to day we take 'knowledge' to mean that we have information that is definitely true. However, in philosophy, and in science, and in history, and pretty much all kinds of study, we tend to treat knowledge as 'justified belief'. Or more accurately, if all the evidence we have points one way, and maybe we don't have 100% of the information, but there's nothing suggesting the other direction, we can comfortably say that something is more likely to be true than not.
Seeing as we only have sound arguments and evidence for the existence of God, and not a single one for his non-existence, I'd call that a justified belief. Piling on to that the personal relationships that so many Christians have experienced, we can even claim certainty until we're proven to all be under some delusion.

1. A17. God does not exist. 

This is meant to follow? How? Maybe I can't follow it to the conclusion because so many of the premises were faulty.

Let's check out a dumbed down version to see if I can grasp it better. Maybe I missed something important that was meant to convince me.

A1 to A2 – If God exists, then all instances of evil are morally justifiable by definition.
A3 to A7 – If all events are morally justifiable, then some believers know that they should not try to stop any instance of presumed evil.
A8 – Yet they do intervene.
A9 to A17 – Therefore their own behaviour proves that God does not exist.

Hmm. This seems to be a whole lot clearer in it's plain nonsensicalness. A9 to A17 just doesn't follow at all from the rest of it. What does a persons behaviour or knowledge have to do with the existence of something else? Maybe it could be that God exists, all evil is justified, and human beings rebel against him by trying to prevent evil. God would still exist, just not in the way we think he does.
Although as I've explained in the longer version, several of the premises don't work when squared against Christianity.
I'm a little embarrassed to have spent so long looking at this argument as though it was worth considering.